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employment.  To avoid the 10 percent tax, the individual
must have received unemployment compensation for 12 or
more consecutive weeks under federal or state law.  A self-
employed individual meets the requirements for
unemployment compensation if the individual would have
received the compensation except for the fact that the
individual had been self-employed. Act § 361, amending
I.R.C. § 72(t).
Corporate-Owned Life Insurance
The legislation phases out the interest deduction for
corporate-owned life insurance over a transitional period.
The interest incurred during the transitional period is
deductible to the extent that the rate of interest does not
exceed the lesser of (1) the rate specified in the contract as
of October 13, 1995, or (2) the applicable percentage of
Moody’s Corporate Bond Yield Average--Monthly Average
Corporates for each month the interest is paid or accrues.
The applicable percentage of Moody’s rate is 100 percent in
1996, 90 percent in 1997, 80 percent in 1998 and zero
thereafter.
An exception is provided for key persons for insurance
contracts not to exceed $50,000. Act § 501(b), amending
I.R.C. § 264.
CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
    CHAPTER 13   -ALM § 13.03.*
PLAN. The debtors, husband and wife, owned a 136
acre farm which was used to feed cattle on contract.  The
husband had income from an army pension and the wife was
employed as a school teacher. The debtors failed to list any
livestock, feed or supplies on their asset schedules, failed to
list the army pension as income and failed to list an account
receivable of $4,000. The husband had borrowed the
downpayment for the farm and failed to repay the loan,
although the debtors often had the resources to make the
payments. The debtors’ plan proposed to pay the largest
unsecured creditor 100 percent of the claim but the rest of
the unsecured creditors only 4 percent of their claims. At the
time of the plan confirmation, the husband was not actively
employed, either on the farm or elsewhere, even though the
husband was in good health and had marketable skills. The
court denied confirmation of the plan as not proposed in
good faith, primarily because the husband had no plans to
seek gainful employment during the plan. The court noted
that the husband was well able to secure employment on or
off the farm sufficient to pay all creditors 100 percent of
their claims over the plan period. In re Jobe, 197 B.R. 823
(Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1996).
   FEDERAL TAXATION    -ALM § 13.03[7].*
DISCHARGE. The debtor was assessed a penalty,
under I.R.C. § 6698, for failure to file a partnership return.
The Bankruptcy Court had allowed the discharge of the
penalty, under Section 523(a)(7)(A), because the penalty did
not relate to any tax. The District court reversed, holding
that because the penalty did not relate to a dischargeable
tax, the penalty was nondischargeable. United States v.
Amici, 197 B.R. 696 (M.D. Fla. 1996), rev’g, 177 B.R. 386
(Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1995).
The debtors, husband and wife, filed for Chapter 7 in
1990 and sought to have income taxes for 1977 through
1983 declared dischargeable. For the 1974 tax return, the
husband claimed income based upon the dollar’s “gold
value” and a notice of deficiency was upheld in the courts.
In 1975, the husband transferred the debtors’ assets and
assigned income to a family estate trust without
consideration and without relinquishing possession or
control to the trust. The trust was also declared invalid by
the courts. The debtors failed to file any returns for 1980
through 1983 and the husband was found guilty of failure to
file income tax returns and was ordered to pay a penalty,
court costs, and the taxes owed and was placed on
probation. The probation was revoked when the husband
failed to pay any taxes owed for 1980 through 1983. The
court held that the 1974 and 1975, as well as the 1980
through 1983, actions of the husband were relevant to show
the husband’s willful failure to pay taxes and denied the
husband’s discharge as to the 1977 through 1983 taxes. The
court held, however, that, although the wife signed all joint
returns, the IRS had failed to show that she committed any
actions which amounted to willful attempt to evade payment
of taxes. Matter of Birkenstock, 87 F.3d 947 (7th Cir.
1996).
The debtor admitted to filing false W-4 forms with
excessive claimed exemptions for dependents in order to
maximize disposable wage income during the tax year. The
debtor filed accurate federal income tax returns but failed to
fully pay the taxes owed. The IRS filed a claim for those
taxes and sought to have the taxes declared
nondischargeable under Section 523(a)(1)(C) for willful
attempt to evade payment of taxes. The Bankruptcy Court
found that the debtor had intended to file accurate income
tax returns and pay the full amount due; therefore, the
Bankruptcy Court held that the taxes were dischargeable.
The District Court reversed, holding that the Bankruptcy
Court applied the wrong legal test for “willful” as a bad
purpose or evil motive. The court held that a willful act
required only a voluntary, conscious and intentional
violation of a known legal duty; therefore, the debtor’s
intentional falsification of the W-4 forms was sufficient to
make the actions willful under Section 523(a)(1)(C). Smith
v. United States, 96-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,426
(S.D. Ind. 1996).
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
PERISHABLE AGRICULTURAL COMMODITIES
ACT. The plaintiff sold produce to the defendants who later
filed for bankruptcy. The plaintiff sought payment for the
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produce from the PACA trust fund. The defendants were a
corporation which developed, owned and operated
restaurants and a subsidiary corporation which operated its
own restaurants. Both defendants argued that they were not
dealers in produce, under 7 U.S.C. § 499a(b)(6), subject to
PACA. The court noted that the statute was unambiguous
and included retailers with purchases of commodities over
$230,000 per year. The facts demonstrated that the
defendants purchased the produce from a wholesaler, the
plaintiff, for use in the restaurants and both defendants had
annual purchases of commodities exceeding $230,000. The
defendants argued that they were not retailers but were
consumers of the produce. The court held that the
defendants were subject to PACA as retailers because the
defendants enhanced the produce by cooking and other
preparation for serving to customers. Matter of Magic
Restaurants, Inc., 197 B.R. 455 (Bankr. D. Del. 1996).
FEDERAL ESTATE AND
GIFT TAX
CHARITABLE DEDUCTION. The decedent’s will
established two trusts for the benefit of the decedent’s son
who was disabled. Both trusts had charities as remainder
holders. The first trust provided for annual payments equal
to a percentage of the fair market value of the trust assets,
but also provided for payment of the son’s funeral and
burial expenses and any debts or obligations at the son’s
death. The trust allowed the trustees to amend the trust so
that the trust qualified as a charitable remainder annuity
trust. The trustees petitioned a state court to remove the
provision for payment of the funeral and burial expenses
and the son’s obligations. The son’s guardian also petitioned
a state court for permission to file a written disclaimer of the
son’s right to payment for these expenses. The second trust
provided for payments to the son if the first trust’s payments
were insufficient for the son’s care and support. The trustees
petitioned a state court to amend the second trust to provide
for payments equal to the lesser of the net trust income or a
unitrust amount plus deficiencies from prior trust years
when the net income was less than the unitrust amount. The
IRS ruled that both trusts were reformable and that the
amendments to the trusts qualified them for the charitable
deduction.  Ltr. Rul. 9633004, May 6, 1996.
The decedent’s inter vivos trust provided for
testamentary distribution of the trust corpus. The trustee was
required to distribute 80 percent to Roman Catholic
charities, 10 percent to Protestant charities, and 10 percent
to Jewish charities, with the specific charities to be selected
at the trustee’s discretion. The IRS ruled that, under New
York law, the trustee was required to distribute the trust
corpus to charities as defined by the IRC; therefore, the
bequests would qualify for the charitable deduction. Ltr.
Rul. 9634025, May 25, 1996.
CLAIMS AGAINST THE ESTATE. The decedent’s
will provided for bequests to a charitable foundation
established by the decedent. The decedent’s heirs hired
attorneys to prepare litigation against the decedent, the
foundation and the foundation trustee for tortious
interference with inheritance. The parties entered into
negotiations after the decedent’s death and reached a
settlement which included additional payments to the heirs
from the foundation bequest. The foundation stated that the
settlement was reached in order to avoid the legal costs of
litigation. The decedent’s estate claimed the settlement
payments as a deduction as either a claim against the estate
or administrative expenses. The court denied the deduction,
holding that the settlement was a nondeductible distribution
to heirs because the cause of action for interference with
inheritance could not have been brought against the
decedent but was a liability of the foundation or its trustee.
The court held that the settlement was not a deductible
administrative expense because the estate was not benefited
or diminished by the action. Lindberg v. United States,
927 F. Supp. 1401 (D. Colo. 1996).
DISCLAIMERS-ALM § 5.02[6].* The IRS has issued
proposed regulations concerning the requirement that a
qualified disclaimer occur within nine months after creation
of the interest disclaimed. The IRS noted in the comments,
that in United States v. Irvine, 981 F.2d 991 (8th Cir. 1992),
rev’d on another point, 114 S. Ct. 1473 (1994), a disclaimer
of a pre-gift tax transfer was not subject to the nine-month
rule because no taxable transfer had occurred. The proposed
regulations provide that the nine-month rule applies to inter
vivos or testamentary transfers, whether or not any gift or
estate tax is imposed on the transfer. The same applies to
interests passing as a result of an exercise, release or lapse
of a general power of appointment, whether or not the event
is subject to gift or estate tax. The proposed regulations
clarify this rule by changing the prior regulations use of the
term “taxable transfer” to the statutory term “transfer
creating the interest.” Prop. Treas. Reg. §§ 20.2041-
3(d)(6); 20.2046-1(a); 20.2056(d)-2(a),(b); 25.2511-1(c);
25.2514-3(c); 25.2518-1; 25.2518-2(c)(3).
The IRS also noted that the regulations governing the
disclaimer of a survivorship interest in joint tenancy
property were held invalid in several cases (see, e.g.,
Kennedy v. Commissioner, 804 F.2d 1332 (7th Cir. 1986)).
The proposed amendments would revise the regulations to
provide that, if a joint tenancy may be unilaterally severed
by either party, a surviving joint tenant may disclaim the
one-half survivorship interest in property held in joint
tenancy with right of survivorship within 9 months of the
death of the first joint tenant to die, even if the surviving
joint tenant provided some or all of the consideration for the
creation of the tenancy. Thus, the new rule does not apply to
unseverable tenancies (tenancies by the entirety). Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-2(c)(4).
The proposed regulations provide that the 9-month
period for making the qualified disclaimer commences on
the death of the first joint tenant of a joint bank account. The
proposed regulations also clarify that a surviving joint
tenant cannot disclaim any portion of the account
attributable to that survivor's contribution to the account.
Further, the proposed regulations clarify that this rule
applies even if only one-half of the property is included in
the decedent's gross estate under I.R.C. § 2040(b) because
the joint tenants are married. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-
2(c)(4)(iv).
    The proposed regulations also clarify the estate tax
treatment of a disclaimed interest in a joint bank account.
State law generally deems a disclaimant to have
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predeceased the decedent with respect to the disclaimed
interest. The disclaimed interest in a joint bank account (the
creation of which is treated as an incomplete gift under the
gift tax regulations), would lose its character as joint
property and pass through the decedent's probate estate.
Accordingly, under such circumstances, the interest
disclaimed is subject to inclusion in the decedent's gross
estate under I.R.C. § 2033, rather than I.R.C. § 2040(a)
(providing for inclusion based on the contribution of each
tenant) or I.R.C. § 2040(b) (providing for inclusion of one-
half the property in the case of certain joint tenancies
between spouses). The balance of the account not subject to
the disclaimer retains its character as joint property and is
includible in the decedent's gross estate under either I.R.C. §
2040(a) or I.R.C. § 2040(b). Prop. Treas. Reg. § 25.2518-
2(c)(5), Examples 13, 14, 15.  61 Fed. Reg. 43197 (Aug.
21, 1996).
GENERATION SKIPPING TRANSFERS-ALM §
5.04[6].* The decedent’s will bequeathed property in trust
from an inter vivos trust to several grandchildren. The will
provided that, if a grandchild died “before receipt” of the
trust corpus, the share passed to that grandchild’s issue, or if
no issue survived, to the other surviving grandchildren or
their issue. The IRS interpreted the “before receipt”
language as requiring that a grandchild survive until actual
receipt of the bequeathed property in order for the
grandchild’s interest to have vested; therefore, the property
would not be included in he grandchild’s gross estate unless
actually delivered before the grandchild’s death. Under
Section 1433 of Pub. L. No 99-514, as amended by Pub. L.
No. 100-647, a transfer of property in trust to a grandchild is
eligible for the GSTT exemption only if the property was
includible in the grandchild’s gross estate. The estate argued
that the language was ambiguous; therefore, the Michigan
law favoring vesting applied where the language is
ambiguous. The court agreed with the estate that the
language was ambiguous, citing language elsewhere in the
will which referred to the vested interests and required an
accounting to the beneficiaries during the administration of
the estate. The court applied the Michigan rule in favor of
vesting and held that the bequest qualified for the GSTT
exemption.  Comerica Bank, N.A. v. United States, 96-2
U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 60,242 (6th Cir. 1996).
INSTALLMENT PAYMENT OF ESTATE TAX-
ALM § 5.05[1]. * The decedent owned interests in several
corporations, two of which were the subject of this ruling.
The first corporation developed and constructed rental real
estate. The second corporation provided management
services for rental properties owned by the corporation and
other entities owned by members of the decedent’s family.
The IRS ruled that both corporations were considered to be
operating a trade or business for purposes of installment
payment of estate tax. Ltr. Rul. 9634006, May 14, 1996.
MARITAL DEDUCTION-ALM § 5.04[3].* The
decedent’s will established a trust for the surviving spouse.
The trust provided for payment of $2,500 per month for ten
years with the remainder of the trust to be paid to the
spouse, if the spouse was alive at the end of ten years, or to
the spouse’s estate if the spouse died before the end of ten
years. The IRS ruled that the trust qualified for the marital
deduction. Ltr. Rul. 9634020, May 24, 1996.
POWER OF ATTORNEY. The decedent had granted a
daughter a power of attorney which included broad powers
to manage the decedent’s affairs, to convey and sell
property, and otherwise do with the property as if the
daughter was the decedent. The power of attorney listed a
significant number of specific powers granted except
nowhere did the instrument convey authority to make gifts
of the decedent’s property. The daughter made several gifts
during the decedent’s lifetime. The IRS ruled that the gifted
property was included in the decedent’s estate because the
daughter did not have the authority to make the gifts and the
gifts were revocable on the decedent’s date of death. Ltr.
Rul. 9634004, May 2, 1996.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
APPEALS. The taxpayers sent a Form 2848, Power of
Attorney and Declaration of Representative, to the IRS after
an audit was begun on the taxpayers’ 1992 return. The form
listed the address of the taxpayer’s attorney as the address
for all notices and communications to the taxpayers from the
IRS. A Notice of Deficiency, dated December 14, 1995, was
sent to the taxpayers and a copy was sent to the taxpayers’
attorney. The attorney twice contacted the IRS about the
final due date for any appeal of the deficiency notice and
was told each time, and confirmed once by letter, that the
final appeal date was March 14, 1996. The correct final date
was March 13, 1996, 90 days after the date of the deficiency
notice. The appeal was sent by certified mail, postmarked
March 14, 1996 and the IRS moved to dismiss the appeal
for lack of jurisdiction because the appeal was not timely
filed. The taxpayers argued that the deficiency notice appeal
period did not begin until it was received at the address
listed on the Form 2848 and not from the date sent to the
taxpayers. The taxpayers also argued that the IRS should be
bound by the advice of its agents, even though incorrect.
The court held that the IRS failure to send the original
notice to the taxpayers’ representative did not affect the
effective date of the notice where the original notice was
received by the taxpayers and a copy was sent to the
representative, both giving the taxpayers adequate time to
make a timely appeal. The court also held that the errors of
IRS employees could not waive jurisdictional requirements
and that the taxpayers had the responsibility to calculate
correctly the appeal limitations period. There is no
discussion of why the taxpayers waited so long to file the
appeal.  Elgart v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 1996-379.
BUSINESS EXPENSES. The taxpayer was the sole
shareholder of a corporation. The taxpayer retained over
$120,000 which was paid to the corporation and the issue
was how much of that amount was paid to the taxpayer in
reimbursement for corporate expenses paid by the taxpayer.
The taxpayer claimed automobile expenses incurred for the
corporation but the court disallowed most of the expenses
for lack of any record by the taxpayer that the expenses
were for business purposes. The court also disallowed most
meal expenses because the taxpayer provided no evidence to
substantiate a business purpose for the meals. The taxpayer
was not allowed to deduct payments made to a former
spouse because the income was chargeable to the taxpayer
as the sole shareholder and officer and the payments would
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be an impermissible assignment of income. The court also
held that the taxpayer was the sole shareholder because the
taxpayer filed corporate tax returns declaring the taxpayer as
the sole shareholder. Ellabban v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
1996-382.
LEGAL FEES. The taxpayers’ principal residence was
destroyed in a fire and the taxpayers filed a claim with their
insurance company. The taxpayers incurred legal fees in
negotiating a settlement with the insurance company and
claimed the payment of those fees as a miscellaneous
deduction. The house was not used in any trade or business
and any gain from the insurance proceeds was eligible for
deferment upon the rebuilding of the house. The court held
that the legal fees were not currently deductible because
they were incurred as part of a recovery of a capital asset.
Jasko v. Comm’r, 107 T.C. No. 3 (1996).
LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES. The taxpayers, all
siblings, shared ownership of two contiguous parcels of land
which had a total of three residences. The parcels were
originally owned by one ancestor who devised the property
to several heirs. The parcels eventually were devised to the
three taxpayers as tenants in common with the taxpayers
receiving ownership to the two parcels at different times.
The taxpayers divided the total land into four parcels, three
with one residence and one undeveloped property. Each
taxpayer received full title to one residential parcel and an
undivided interest in the undeveloped parcel. The interests
in the undeveloped parcel were determined so as to equalize
the value of the property received by each taxpayer with the
initial one-third interest in the total property. The IRS ruled
that, because the parcels were contiguous, the parcels would
be treated as one property; therefore, Rev. Rul. 56-437,
1956-2 C.B. 507 applied to allow tax-free exchange
treatment of the transaction. The taxpayers were all equally
liable for a mortgage on the properties incurred to make
improvements. The exchange agreement provided for each
taxpayer to remain obligated for one-third of this debt. The
IRS ruled that this agreement did not affect the equal
division of the property.  Ltr. Rul. 9633028, May 20, 1996;
Ltr. Rul. 9633033, May 20, 1996; Ltr. Rul. 9633034, May
20, 1996.
RETURNS. The IRS has announced that under the
Taxpayer Bill of Rights, Pub. L. No. 104-168, Forms W-2G,
1098, 1099-A, 1099-B, 1099-DIV, 1099-G, 1099-INT,
1099-Misc, 1099-OID, 1099-PATR and 1099-S for 1996
will require inclusion of a telephone number of a person to
contact about statements on the form. Because the 1996
versions of these forms have already been printed, the IRS
has waived any penalty for failure to include the phone
number on the 1996 forms only. The IRS recommends,
however, that the phone numbers be included in the box for
the flier’s name and address or anywhere else on the form.
Ann. 96-88.
SALE OF RESIDENCE. During a previous marriage in
Seattle, the taxpayer owned a principal residence. After the
divorce, the taxpayer lived in the house for about one year
and then moved to San Diego. The house was rented to
unrelated parties for seven years before it was sold by the
taxpayer at a gain. The taxpayer remarried and obtained a
residence by having friends purchase a house, with the
taxpayer agreeing to renovate the house in exchange for the
right to live in the house and an equity interest after
completion of the work. The court held that the taxpayer
was not entitled to defer the gain on the sale of the first
residence because a second residence was not purchased
within two years after the sale. Edmondson v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 1996-393.
SAFE HARBOR INTEREST RATES
September 1996
Annual Semi-annual Quarterly Monthly
Short-term
AFR 6.02 5.93 5.89 5.86
110% AFR 6.63 6.52 6.47 6.43
120% AFR 7.25 7.12 7.06 7.02
Mid-term
AFR 6.64 6.53 6.48 6.44
110% AFR 7.31 7.18 7.12 7.07
120% AFR 7.99 7.84 7.76 7.71
Long-term
AFR 7.03 6.91 6.85 6.81
110% AFR 7.74 7.60 7.53 7.48
120% AFR 8.46 8.29 8.21 8.15
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
PRODUCER’S LIEN. The bankruptcy debtor was a
processor of walnuts who had purchased “combination”
walnuts from a California producer/processor (the creditor).
The creditor filed a secured claim for unpaid walnuts, based
on the California Producer’s Lien Statute, Cal. Food &
Agric. Code § 55631. The trustee sought to avoid the lien
under Section 545(2) as a bona fide purchaser. The court
reluctantly followed Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
precedent in holding that the lien was not avoidable because
the lien was unenforceable against a bona fide purchaser
only if the purchaser took possession; therefore, the lien was
enforceable against the trustee as hypothetical bone fide
purchaser because the trustee did not take possession of the
walnuts. The court also held that there was an issue of fact
as to whether the walnuts involved were produced by the
creditor and were not produced by other parties and
processed by the creditor prior to sale to the debtor. The
debtor argued that the lien was released by the creditor
because the creditor sold the walnuts on a “Net 30” basis.
The court held that, under Cal. Food & Agric. Code §
55639, the allowance of time to make payment for produce
was not a waiver of the lien. In re S.N.A. Nut Co., 197 B.R.
642 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1996).
AMERCIAN AGRICULTURAL
LAW ASSOCIATION
ANNUAL CONFERENCE
The AALA is meeting October 3-5, 1996 at the Westin
Hotel in Seattle, WA. The theme for this year’s conference
is “Legal Service to Agriculture in the 21st Century.”
Speakers include Secretary of Agriculture Dan Glickman,
Jake Looney, Bill Oemichen, Neil Hamilton, Roger
McEowen, Phil Harris, Nels Ackerson, Gordon Tanner and
Terry Centner.
Seattle is a friendly and fascinating city, full of the
charm and beauty of the Pacific Northwest. The Agricultural
Law Press will be there and we hope you will too.
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P.O. BOX 50703
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CITATION UPDATES
Buchanan v. United States, 87 F.3d 197 (7th Cir.
1996) (bad debt) see p. 106 supra.
Roels v. United States, 928 F. Supp 812 (E.D. Wis.
1996) (marital deduction) see p. 105 supra.
STATE TAXATION
VALUATION. The taxpayer’s ranch included land in
two counties, with the land in one county either not suitable
for crops or isolated and inaccessible to farm machinery.
The assessment of the ranch land was different for the
parcels in each county and the inaccessible land was
discounted $2.00 an acre to adjust for the inaccessibility.
The taxpayer argued that the different values for portions of
the same ranch were improper; however, the taxpayer did
not provide any case or statutory authority for this issue.
The court held that this issue was waived for failure to
provide authority. The taxpayer also argued that the
valuation of the inaccessible land was improper because the
county assessor did not use any comparative sales to
determine the value. The county assessor admitted that
there were no sales of inaccessible land in the county. The
court held that the valuation was improper because the
statute, S.D. Code § 10-6-23, required valuation to be based
on comparative sales. The court stated that the assessor
should have looked for sales in neighboring counties or
sales farther back in time. West Rivers Ranch v.
Pennington Co., 549 N.W.2d 683 (S.D. 1996).
AGRICULTURAL LAW PRESS
ON THE WEB
http://members.aol.com/aglaw/agpub
Check out our internet site for information about:
• Agricultural Law Manual, by Neil E. Harl, a
comprehensive, annotated looselef deskbook.
• Principles of Agricultural Law, a college textbook, by
Roger A. McEowen and Neil E. Harl, due for publication in
December 1996.
• Seminar in Paradise, “Farm Estate and Business
Planning,” by Neil E. Harl in Hawaii, January 6-10, 1997.
• Direct internet links to legal resources on the internet.
• Direct email link to the Agricultural Law Press.
We welcome any suggestions for improving our web
site.
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